➥ CASE SUMMARY OF:
Nigerian Agip Oil Company Limited V. Janyim Nigeria Limited & Ors. (CA/PH/240/2009, 10 Jul 2014)
by Branham Chima (LL.B.)
➥ SUBJECT MATTER(S)
Suing in representative capacity;
General damages.
➥ CASE FACT/HISTORY
For themselves and representing the Umu-Udie family, the respondents had sued the appellant before the Federal High Court, sitting at Yenagoa, claiming the following reliefs: a. A declaration that the plaintiff’s are entitled to payment of general damages or reasonable and adequate compensation for the losses and damages suffered by the plaintiffs in respect of the aforesaid spillage/pollution.
b. Fifty million naira (₦50,000,000.00) being general damages or reasonable and adequate compensation for the damages done to the plaintiffs’ fish ponds, lakes, fishing nets/gears/ fences, fishing rights economic crops/trees, farm crops/trees, swamps/stream, among others, in the imparted area by the aforementioned oil spillage/pollution.
The facts from which the above claims arose, as contained in the respondents’ amended statement of claim dated and filed on 21 July 2003, are briefly that sometime on 27 July 1997, there was an oil spillage/pollution at the Oshie Agip Oil Flowstation of the appellant which spread and entered into an area of the respondents’ family land known and called Uyagbelewe, situate at Ukpeliede in Ahoada-West Local Government of Rivers State. The spillage polluted and destroyed their family trees, fishing rights, water streams, creeks, lakes, ponds, crops, juju shrines, distilling camps, etc. After a report of the spillage by them, the appellant stopped the source of the spill, put its equipment to check further spread of the spilt oil and cleaned the spilt oil. However, because the appellant did not clean up the oil according to FEPA’s standard, flood carried it beyond the equipment into the respondents land and impacted their said family land. After refusal by the appellant to pay compensation to them, the respondents initiated the suit.
In the amended statement of defence, dated 4 April 2005, the appellant denied the claims made against it and after settlement of pleadings, the case proceeded to trial after which the High Court entered judgment in favour of the respondents on 30 June 2008. Dissatisfied with the judgment by the Federal High Court, the appellant through its counsel, filed a notice of appeal dated 2 July 2008, containing a lone ground against it.
➥ ISSUE(S)
I. Whether the suit was properly constituted as a representative action?
II. Whether the Federal High Court was right that the appellant did not join issue with the respondents on the fact that their land was imparted and if the land was impacted on the evidence before it?
III. Whether the Federal High Court was right to have awarded general damages as well as order the appellant to clean the spill up to FEPA’s standard?
➥ RESOLUTION(S) OF ISSUES
[APPEAL DISMISSED]
↪️ ISSUE 1: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[THE RESPONDENTS HAVE JURISTIC PERSONALITY
‘In the present appeal, the appellant is not challenging the competence of the respondents’ suit on the ground that all the respondents are not juristic and so have no competence to sue or be sued in law. The argument is simply that the family for who the respondents also initiated the suit on behalf, is not juristic, cannot sue or be sued and consequently lacks the competence to authorize the suit on its behalf. However, the respondents sued or commenced the action for themselves in the first place, and then, on behalf of their family, in the second place. From the pleadings, the 2nd-4th respondents are people who were said to have been affected by the oil spill, the subject of the suit and so with or without the family they are competent as human beings to initiate the action before the Federal High Court against the appellant. Their juristic personality in law, cannot and has not been challenged by the appellant in the present appeal. Furthermore, the appellant had not challenged that the 2nd-4th respondents, were members of the Umu-Udie family and such members, cannot or lack the requisite juristic personality to sue for and on behalf of all the other members who constitute or make up the family. A family, whatever its name or name given to it, I agree with the learned counsel for the respondents, simply means all persons or group of persons who share common ancestry and blood relationship in a community. See Okulate v. Awosanya (2000) FWLR (Pt. 25) 1666, (2000)2 NWLR (Pt. 646) 530; Franklin Fire lus Co. v. Shadid, Tex. Com. App. 68, SW. 2d 1030 at 1032 Hartley v. Bahrer, 52 Idaho 72, 11 Probate, 2d. 616 at 618.’
‘Since there was no challenge to the authority of the respondents to sue for and on behalf of the family and leave was sought for and granted by the Federal High Court to do so in a representative capacity, the respondent’s suit was properly constituted and that court had the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate over it. The respondents’ suit was initiated or commenced by them as individuals and then as representatives of the other members of the family, in addition. With or without the representation of the other members of the family, the respondents’ suit was properly constituted for the Federal High Court to be vested with the requisite jurisdiction to entertain it.’
EACH OF THE RESPONDENTS SUFFERED DAMAGE
‘Furthermore, because each of the respondents suffered damages, injury or loss arising from the spill into the land in question and is entitled in law to file an action to claim for the loss or injury he suffered, then the respondents either individually or with the authority or consent of the others individuals who jointly suffered loss or injury from the spill and who constitute the group of individuals known as the Umu-Udie family, can sue to claim damages for the loss or injury they suffered. Reason would be put and made to stand on its head if individuals who suffered losses or injuries resulting from a single act or omission of another cannot authorize some of them to sue for damages on behalf of all of them. Depending on the nature of the wrongful act or omission, where, as in the case of the respondents, it was such that it affected not only individuals or families, but communities or villages in the same manner or way and at the same time causing the same nature of damage, loss or injury to their land and waters, which are their only means of livelihood, it would be absolutely absurd and revolting to logic and reason to say that each individual in the said families, communities or villages has to file a suit alone to claim for the damages suffered and that he cannot authorize another/other members to do so on his behalf.’]
.
.
↪️ ISSUE 2: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR, in part.
[THE LEARNED TRIAL JUDGE WAS WRONG TO SAY THAT THE RESPONDENTS NEED NOT CALL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR PLEADINGS
‘Looking at the state of the pleadings by the appellant in paragraphs 4 and 6 of the amended statement of defence, it is clear that there is a denial of the respondents’ case such that there is a real conflict and contradiction between the two cases put forward in the respective pleadings as to join issues on the facts so pleaded. There was a specific denial by the appellant that the respondents’ land was impacted or affected by the spill from its flow station and that the oil spread further into their land. There was therefore a proper traverse of the respondents’ paragraph 4 of the amended statement of claim by the appellant’s paragraphs 4 and 6 of the amended statement of defence and issue was effectively joined by them on the facts contained in the said pleadings. There was no semblance of an admission or ground for the presumption or deeming of such admission on the part of the appellant of the case put forward by the respondents in their paragraph 4. Having joined issues frontally on the pleadings, in order to succeed on the case made in respect of the said pleadings, the law requires proof from the respondents on the balance of probability or preponderance of evidence as provided for in section 134 of the Evidence Act 2011 (section 132 of the 2004 Act). See Daodu v. N.N.P.C. (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt. 538) 355; Otaru and Sons Ltd v. Idris (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 606) 330; Audu v. Guta (supra); Mani v. Shanono (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt. 969) 132, (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 345) 303; Veepee Industries Ltd v. Cocoa Industries Ltd (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 425) 1667, (2008) 7 MJSC 125; Ayorinde v. Sogunro (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 636) 403, (2012) 5-7 MJSC (Pt. III) 1. In these premises, the Federal High Court was clearly in error of law to have held that the respondents had no duty to call or adduce evidence to prove the pleadings in paragraph 4 of the amended statement of claim and the reply to the amended statement of defence on the ground that the appellant did not join issues on them.’
NONETHELESS THERE WAS ORAL EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE CLAIM OF THE RESPONDENTS DAMAGE
‘The fact that the survey report pleaded by the respondents or expert witnesses were not put in evidence or called by them, did not detract from their unchallenged proof that the spill affected their land. The evidence given by the two (2) witnesses for the appellant did not controvert that the respondents’ land was impacted by the spill or that the appellant’s containment boom was placed on the said land to stop or contain the spill or further spread. Evidence which is unchallenged credible, sufficient and direct on the facts it seeks to prove, is cogent evidence which a trial court is entitled to accept and act or rely on in its findings on the issues in controversy between parties in a case. Olujinle v. Adeagbo (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 75) 238, (1988) 4 SCNJ 1; Ikuomola v. Oniwaya (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 617, (1990) 21 NSCC (Pt. 3) 95; American Cyanamid Company v. Vitality Pharmacetical Ltd (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 171) 15; Asafa Foods Factory Ltd v. Alraine (Nig.) Ltd (2002) FWLR (Pt. 125) 756, (2002) 12 NWLR (Pt. 781) 353 at 375. In the case of Newbreed Organisation Ltd v. Erhomosele (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 307) 1076, (2006) 2 SC (Pt. 1) 136 at 168, it was held that where a plaintiff adduces oral evidence which establishes his claim in terms of the writ of summons or statement of claim and it is not rebutted either by challenging same under cross examination or controverting it in evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment. The evidence of the respondents’ witnesses established their claim in paragraph 4 and reply to the amended statement of defence that their land was impacted by the spill in question and the evidence was not challenged under cross examination or otherwise controverted by the evidence of the two (2) witnesses called by the appellant and so the respondents were entitled to judgment. The Federal High Court was, for that reason, right to find that from the evidence before it, the respondents’ land was affected or impacted by the spill in question.’
‘In the result, while issue 2 is resolved in favour of the appellant, issue 3 is resolved against it. The effect is that even though the High Court erred to have found that the respondents’ paragraph 4 and the reply to the amended statement of defence were deemed admitted by the appellant and so required no proof, the respondents’ evidence had proved or established that their land was impacted by the spill, on the balance of probabilities as required by law.’]
.
.
↪️ ISSUE 3: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[GENERAL DAMAGES FLOW NATURALLY TO COMPENSATE THE DEFENDANTS
‘In the present appeal, since the High Court had found that the respondents’ land was impacted by the spill in question from the evidence before it and state of the pleadings, the general damages they claimed are automatically presumed by law to have flowed from the impact of the spill. In the circumstances, the respondents did even have to; have no legal duty or obligation, to plead the actual damages or quantum of such damages or go ahead thereafter, even if pleaded, to prove them as general damages. In this regard, it was not necessary for the respondents to have tendered any survey or valuation report on the measure of the general damages they claimed before the High Court can properly assess or quantify the amount of such damages as would, in the circumstances of the case, be reasonably adequate. The law is also well known that the primary object or aim of damages is to, as far as money can do so, compensate a plaintiff for the injury or harm done or precipitated by the acts or omission of a defendant. See Acme Builders Ltd v. Kaduna State Waterboard (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt. 590) 288; Rockonoh Prop. Co. Ltd v. NITEL Plc (2001) FWLR (Pt. 67) 885, (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 733) 468; Ijebu-Ode Local Govt. v. Balogun and Co (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt.166) 136, (1991) 1 SCNJ 1; Adeniran v. Alao (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 223) 350 at 372.’
‘The learned counsel for the appellant did not demonstrate in his brief of argument that from the evidence before the trial Federal High Court and the circumstances of the case, the award of damages by it comes within the purview of any of the above situations. In additional, he did not also show why the trial court was not right to have ordered the appellant to clean up the spill up to FEPA’s standard in addition to the award of damages. The only grievance which appears in the submissions of counsel on the order to clean up, is that the appellant had cleaned up the split oil with certification by the DPR, which would appear to be different from and must be lower than the FEPA’s standard. That alone, does not make the order to clean up unreasonable in the circumstances of the case since the evidence shows that the clean up by the appellant was not satisfactory. I find no reason or justification to interfere with the award of damages or the order for the clean up. The issue is therefore resolved against the appellant.’]
.
.
.
✓ DECISION:
‘In the final result, although issue 2 was resolved in the appellant’s favour, the appeal is left without merit with the resolution of the other issues against it. For that reason, the appeal is dismissed and the judgment of the trial Federal High Court delivered on 30 June 2008, is hereby affirmed. There shall be costs of ₦50,000.00 (fifty thousand naira) in favour of the respondents and to be paid by the appellant.’
➥ FURTHER DICTA:
⦿ AN APPELLATE COURT CAN REFORMULATE ISSUES RAISED IN THE BRIEF OF COUNSEL
In the case of Chabasaya v. Anwasi (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 528) 839, (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1201) 163 at 181, it was held by the Supreme Court that: “An appellate court can ignore some or all issues raised in briefs and formulate its own the way it deems them to be material once they are distilled from the grounds of appeal. It is also at liberty to choose any of the issues raised in the briefs to treat first and not constrain to treat issues in the numerical order set out in the briefs.” See also Abiola v. 7-UP Bottling Co. Ltd (2012) 5-7 MJSC (Pt. 11) 194 at 215. — M. L. Garba JSC.
⦿ JURISDICTION IS A THRESHOLD ISSUE THAT MUST HE DECIDED FIRST
Now, the issue of the jurisdiction of a court to adjudicate over or entertain a case or matter brought before it, is intrinsic in all judicial proceedings. It is therefore a fundamental, crucial and threshold issue which goes to the heart of the courts’ judicial power and authority to adjudicate over a cause or matter by conducting proceedings to determine the rights and obligations of the parties therein. Because it’s the foundation, basis and stamp of authority on which the judicial power and authority of the court can validly and effectively be exercised to adjudicate or entertain a cause or matter, the position of the law is that the absence of the requisite jurisdiction or any fatal defect therein, to adjudicate or entertain a cause or matter, would render any proceedings; from the beginning or commencement, to the end or final disposal, by a court, null, void and of no legal effect or consequence, howsoever. Before a court can properly assume jurisdiction to adjudicate or entertain a cause or matter, the conditions stipulated in the famous and locus classicus case of Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (supra) and restated and enunciated upon in countless judicial authorities of the Supreme Court must be satisfied. These very well known conditions are that: (a) That the court is property constituted as regards numbers and qualification of the members and no member is disqualified for one reason or another. (b) That the subject matter of the case is one within the jurisdiction of the court and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction, and (c) That the case comes before the court initiated by due process of law and upon the fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of its jurisdiction. See also African Newspapers of Nigeria v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 6) 137 at 157-60; Tukur v. Government of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) 549; Attorney-General, Anambra State v. Attorney-General, Federation (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 302) 692. — M. L. Garba JSC.
⦿ TYPES OF PARTIES TO A SUIT
Speaking generally in law, parties to an action are classified or categorized into three (3) as follows: (i) Proper parties, (ii) Necessary parties (iii) Desirable parties A proper party to or in a suit, is a party, who though not interested in the plaintiff’s claim is made a party for some reason. A necessary party in a suit is a party who is not only interested in the subject matter of the suit but also in whose absence, the proceedings or the suit, could not be fairly dealt with by the court, completely and fully. A desirable party is one who has an interest or who may be affected by the result or the action. See Green v. Green (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 480; Mobil Oil Plc v. D.E.N.R. Ltd (2004) 1 NWLR (Pt. 853) 142; Dapianlong v. Dariye (No. 1) (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 373) 1, (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1036) 239. — M. L. Garba JSC.
⦿ FOR A SUIT TO PROCEED IN RESPECT TO PARTIES, ALL THAT IS NEEDED IS A COMPETENT PLAINTIFF AND A COMPETENT DEFENDANT
In any suit, there must be at least one competent plaintiff and a competent defendant for it to be competent and vest the requisite jurisdiction on the court to adjudicate over the case. The law is also firmly settled that the joinder or misjoinder of parties to an action does not affect the competence of the action or the jurisdiction of the court over the said action. See Yusuf v. Adeyemi (2009) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1165) 616; Udo v. C.R.S.N.C (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 732) 116, (2002) FWLR (Pt. 104) 665. Once there is at least a competent plaintiff and a competent defendant in a case, the absence of any of the parties listed above would not affect the competence of a suit or the jurisdiction of a court to entertain it. See Ifeanyi Chukwu (Osondu) Co. Ltd v. Solel Boneh (Nig.) Ltd (2000) FWLR (Pt. 27) 2046, (2000) 5 NWLR (Pt. 656) 322; Udo v. C.R.S.N.C (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 732) 116. — M. L. Garba JSC.
⦿ WHAT IS A FAMILY
A family, whatever its name or name given to it, I agree with the learned counsel for the respondents, simply means all persons or group of persons who share common ancestry and blood relationship in a community. See Okulate v. Awosanya (2000) FWLR (Pt. 25) 1666, (2000)2 NWLR (Pt. 646) 530; Franklin Fire lus Co. v. Shadid, Tex. Com. App. 68, SW. 2d 1030 at 1032 Hartley v. Bahrer, 52 Idaho 72, 11 Probate, 2d. 616 at 618. — M. L. Garba JSC.
⦿ A FAMILY CAN BE REPRESENTED IN COURT – ONE MEMBER CAN SUE ON BEHALF OF ALL
However the Umu-Udie family does not have to be juristic before the members who make it up or constitute it to acquire the name, and who are natural persons, can institute an action in the name and for and on behalf of their collective group name; the family. The family being a group of individuals who have joint interests in the cause of the action against the appellant, any one or more of the members can, with the authority or consent of the others, sue for and on behalf of all of them. See Ifekwe v. Madu (supra). In the case of Atakulu v. N.B.C. Plc (supra), it was held by this court that “where several persons are jointly interested in the same claim, one or any number of them may within the authorization of the others sue for and on behalf of all of them. And it is the person invoking the jurisdiction of court that must be a juristic person, not the party being represented.” Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the case of Ladejobi v. Oguntayo (supra) had stated that: “A person has the right to protect his family interest in a property or title and can sue for himself and on behalf of the family in a representative capacity.” — M. L. Garba JSC.
⦿ PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING PLEADINGS
There are several principles of law governing pleadings, popularly called rules of pleadings, which have been settled and firmly established by judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court, as well as of this court. Among the relevant ones for the purpose of this appeal, are: (a) That the parties are bound by their pleadings. See Ekpezu v. Ndem (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt. 196) 229; Iheanacho v. Chigere (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 226) 204, (2004) 7 SC (Pt. 11) 49; Isheno v. Julius Berger (Nig.) Plc (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 415) 1632, (2008) 4 MJSC 104……. (b) That specific and material averments in pleadings not admitted, must be properly, specifically and directly traversed. See J.E. Elukpo and Sons Ltd v. Adebayo (2005 ) SC (Pt. II) 74; Arisons Trading and Engineering Co. Ltd v. Military Governor of Ogun State (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 496) 1819 (2009) 6 MJSC (Pt. 1) 118. (c) That to constitute a proper and effective traverse in pleadings, the case put forward by the defendant must conflict in material particulars with that of or put forward by the plaintiff and thus put the material averment in issue or issue to be joined by the parties in respect of the facts averred. See Ajao v. Alao (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 802; Agina v. Agina (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 185) 358; Okpeji v. Minister of Agriculture (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 522) 693. (d) That parties, are at liberty to admit any material facts in their pleadings and such admitted facts require no further proof. See section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011; Akibu v. Oduntan (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 222) 210 at 266-7; Nwakanma v. Military Administrator of Abia State (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 388) 185 at 187; Bunge v. Governor, River State (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 325) 1, (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 995) 573. (e) That a fact in pleadings cannot be deemed admitted if it is either expressly or by necessary implications, denied. See Adegboyega v. Awe (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 280) 224; Okoebor v. Eyobo Engineering Services Ltd (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 187) 553. (f) That in the determination of whether there is an admission or proper traverse in pleadings, the entire pleadings of a party are considered and not isolated paragraphs thereof. See Buhari v. Obasanjo (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 273) 1, (2005 ) NWLR (941) 1; Adelusola v. Akinde (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 218) 776, (2004) 5 SC (Pt.11) 71; Ngige v. Obi (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 330) 1041, (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 999) 1. (g) That an averment of fact in a party’s pleadings is deemed to have been or taken as admitted if not specifically denied or traversed. See Agbaje v. Ibru Sea Foods Ltd (1972) 5 SC 50 at 55; Owosho v. Dada (1984) 7 SC 149; British Airways v. Makanjuola (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 311) 276; Gabari v. Ilori (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt. 786) 78 at 100, (2003) FWLR (Pt. 177) 901. — M. L. Garba JSC.
⦿ EFFECTIVE TRAVERSE
It may be recalled that what the law requires for an effective and proper traverse is for the defendant’s case to conflict with or contradict that put forward by the plaintiff in his pleadings. In law, to constitute a proper traverse, it is not necessary that every paragraph of a statement of claim must be specifically denied because what is important is that the defendant’s case, is in material conflict or contradiction with the plaintiff’s case so as to give rise to a real dispute thereon between the parties. See Ajao v. Alao (supra); Ayansina v. Co-operative Bank Ltd (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) 742; Audu v. Guta (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 216) 526, (2004) 4 NWLR (Pt. 864) 463. A traverse in the above context, is therefore a specific denial by a party of an averment in pleadings or of a case put forward in the pleadings so that the proof of the facts in the pleadings becomes necessary. See Okoromaka v. Odiri (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt. 411) 418; UBN Plc v. Scpok (Nig.) Ltd (1998) 12 NWLR (Pt. 578) 439. In Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, at page 163, the word “traverse” was defined as ‘a formal denial of a factual allegation made in the opposing party’s pleading’ The words ‘specific traverse’ were defined to mean: “The common or specific traverse is an express denial of a particular allegation in the opposing pleading in the terms of the allegation, accompanied by a tender of issue or formal offer of the point denied trial” see page 1639. The denial by simple traverse that the defendant does not admit an allegation in pleading and that the plaintiff would be put to the strictest of proof of the allegation has been recognized and accepted as sufficient and effective traverse. See Osafile v. Odi (1994) 2 NWLR (Pt. 325) 125; Buhari v. Obasanjo (supra). — M. L. Garba JSC.
⦿ GENERAL DAMAGES ARE DAMAGES THAT FLOW NATURALLY
Briefly, the law is settled and so trite, that general damages are those damages which the law presumes or implies in every breach and every violation of a legal right. They are loss/es which flow directly from the wrongful acts or omission of a defendant and so its quantum or measure, needs not either be pleaded, nor proved since they are generally presumed by law. The manner in which general damages are assessed measured or quantified by a trial court, is adopting the objective test of relying on what would be the opinion or judgment of a reasonable man in the peculiar circumstances of a case. See Incar (Nig.) Ltd v. Benson Transport Ltd (1975) 3 SC 117; Odumosu v. A.C.B. Ltd (1976) 11 SC 55; Lar v. Stirling Astald Ltd (1977) 11 – 12 SC 53; Osuji v. Isiocha (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 111) 623; Union Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Ajabule (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 611) 1413, (2012) 12 MJSC (Pt. 55) 155. — M. L. Garba JSC.
⦿ SITUATIONS IN WHICH AN APPELLATE COURT WILL INTERFERE WITH THE DECISION OF A LOWER COURT
The situations in which an appellate court would have reason and duty to interfere with the assessment and award of damages by a trial court are: (a) Where the trial court acted upon wrong principle of law, or (b) Where the amount awarded by the trial court is so ridiculously too low or high in view of the evidence before it, or (c) The amount awarded was an entirely erroneous and unreasonable estimate having regard to the circumstance of the case. See Eboh v. Akpotu (1968) 1 All NLR 220; James v. Mid-Motors (Nig.) Co. Ltd (1978) 11-12 SC 31; Williams v. Daily Times (Nig.) Ltd (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 124) 1; Nzeribe v. Dave Engr. Co. Ltd (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 361) 124. — M. L. Garba JSC.
➥ LEAD JUDGEMENT DELIVERED BY:
Mohammed L. Garba JCA.
➥ APPEARANCES
⦿ FOR THE APPELLANT(S)
⦿ FOR THE RESPONDENT(S)
➥ MISCELLANEOUS POINTS
➥ REFERENCED (LEGISLATION)
➥ REFERENCED (CASE)
➥ REFERENCED (OTHERS)
