➥ CASE SUMMARY OF:
Augustine Guobadia V. The State (SC.295/2002 · 20 Feb 2004)
by Branham Chima (LL.B.)
➥ SUBJECT MATTER(S)
Murder;
Death sentence;
Less than 18 years.
➥ CASE FACT/HISTORY
The appellant Augustine Guobadia was charged before the Benin High Court for the murder on 5th February. 1987 of his two year old half brother, Osazuwamen, an offence punishable under section 319(1) of the Criminal Code, Cap. 48 Vol. 11, Laws of Bendel State of Nigeria, 1976. At the trial in which six witnesses testified for the prosecution, the fact that the act of the appellant caused the death of the deceased was not contested. Indeed, both in his statement to the Police, exhibit B, and his evidence in court the appellant confessed to killing the deceased. What was canvassed on his behalf was the defence of insanity. But the learned trial Judge, Obi J, in his judgment of 29th July, 1988 exhaustively considered that defence and in rejecting it, he convicted the appellant of murder and passed a death sentence on him.
On appeal by the appellant to the Benin Division of the Court of Appeal, the main plank of the appeal was that the learned trial Judge ought to have conducted an inquiry to ascertain the actual age of the appellant at the time the offence was committed since if he was found to be under 17 years of age, an appropriate sentence would have been for his imprisonment at the pleasure of the Governor.
The Court of Appeal in dismissing the appeal held that no issue about the appellant’s age arose during the trial of the appellant in the High Court to warrant an enquiry before that court as to the actual age of the appellant at the time of the commission of the offence.
➥ ISSUE(S)
I. Whether the defence of insanity avails the appellant?
II. Whether death sentence ought to be passed on the Appellant by virtue of him being less than 18 years?
➥ RESOLUTION(S) OF ISSUES
[APPEAL ALLOWED]
↪️ ISSUE 1: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[THE DEFENCE OF INSANITY CANNOT AVAIL THE APPELLANT
‘To appreciate the issues canvassed in this appeal, it is necessary to review the facts of the case. The evidence led at the trial revealed that in the morning of 5/2/87, Sunday Guobadia (PW3) the father of the appellant ordered him and one Victor to go to the farm. The appellant and the said Victor proceeded to the farm on a bicycle with Victor conveying the appellant on the bicycle. Half way on their journey to the farm, the appellant changed his mind and decided to return home. While trekking home, PW3 his father met him and tried to persuade him to go to the farm but this was to no avail. When the appellant finally got home, he met Rosaline Guobadia (PW2) his step mother who enquired why the appellant had returned so early. PW2 asked him if he wanted a bath to which he replied affirmately. While PW2 requested her daughter to fetch water for the appellant, the latter fetched water by himself and had his bath. Shortly thereafter, PW2 heard a shout from the deceased who was sleeping inside the house. On getting into the house she found the deceased in a pool of blood and the appellant hiding behind the door with a matched (exhibit C) in his hand. On seeing the PW2, the appellant jumped through the window and escaped to neighbouring village from where he was subsequently arrested after narrating to the villagers what he had done. Meanwhile, the deceased who was being rushed to the hospital died on the way. In his statement to the police, (exhibit B) made on 5/2/87, the very day of the incident, the appellant gave a coherent and rational account of the incident confessing that he killed the deceased.’
THE EVIDENCE OF THE PSYCHOLOGIST IS ON POINT
‘At p. 33 of the record he stated that the evidence of Dr. Malomo (PW5), which he accepted, established beyond doubt that the appellant suffered from no mental disease. In his medical report on the appellant (exhibit A) PW5, a consultant psychiatrist had stated inter alia:- “On examination the only complaints since he came into prison over a year ago has been occasional dizziness. His orientation as to time, place and person is intact. His flow of speech is normal and rational. Emotional reaction to his present predicament is as expected as it is characterised by regret and poorly co-ordinated lies. There is nothing to suggest presence of insane delusion or any other type of abnormal experience. He is fully aware of the nature and gravity of the alleged offence.” Learned counsel to the appellant had contended that PW5 did not examine the appellant immediately before or after the commission of the offence to ascertain his medical condition at the relevant time. But the report of PW5 quoted above reveals that the observation on the appellant started when he was admitted into the psychiatric hospital’s wing of the prison about the time he was charged to court.’
‘I have no reason to disagree with the finding. The defence of insanity or insane delusion does not avail the appellant. There was no shred of evidence on record to establish that defence.’]
.
.
↪️ ISSUE 2: IN APPELLANT’S FAVOUR.
[THE DEATH SENTENCE IS SET ASIDE AND ORDERED TO BE DETAINED AT THE PLEASURE OF THE PRESIDENT
‘In the case of Modupe v. The State (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 87) 130 at p. 142, this court held that where the age of the accused person is material for the purpose of conviction or relevant in the determination of the nature of the sentence and evidence of such age is not conclusive, the trial Judge is obliged to make due inquiry as to the age of that person by taking evidence of such age. It was also held in the case of George v. The State (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 214) 199 that where there is evidence before the trial Judge that the appellant was 17 years old at the time of commission of the offence, the need to resolve the issue of appellant’s age no longer arises. In the instant case, the appellant’s age as reflected in his statement of the police (exhibit B) is 20 years. But in exhibit A, the report of the consultant psychiatrist (PW5) the age of the appellant as at 28th April, 1988 when the report was written is 18 years. The offence was committed on 5th February, 1987. Learned counsel to the appellant has reasoned that if the appellant was 18 years old in April 1988, he would have been under 17 years old in February 1987 when the offence was committed. There was therefore a discrepancy as to the true age of the appellant. This in my view ought to have prompted the learned trial Judge to conduct an enquiry to ascertain the actual age of the appellant at the material time as envisaged by section 208 of the Criminal Procedure Law. Learned counsel for the respondent has conceded, quite rightly, that since it was doubtful that the appellant has attained the age of 17 years when he committed the offence, that doubt ought to be resolved in his favour. On this score alone, this appeal succeeds with respect to the death sentence pronounced on the appellant. The appeal is allowed. The death sentence passed on the appellant is set aside and in its place, the appellant is ordered to be detained at the pleasure of the Governor of Edo State.’]
.
.
.
✓ DECISION:
‘The appeal is allowed. The death sentence passed on the appellant is set aside and in its place, the appellant is ordered to be detained at the pleasure of the Governor of Edo State.’
➥ FURTHER DICTA:
⦿ APPEAL ON AN ISSUE CANNOT LIE DIRECTLY FROM THE TRIAL COURT TO THE SUPREME COURT WITHOUT LEAVE
It needs to be emphasised that the defence of insanity being canvassed for the appellant in this court is incompetent, since the defence was not raised in the court below. It is not competent for an appellant who raised an issue at the trial court, abandoned that issue at the Court of Appeal and only to take it up again in this court. Constitutionally, this court is enjoined to hear appeals from decisions of the Court of Appeal. It has no jurisdiction to entertain appeals directly from decisions of High Courts and in this regard it is apposite to refer to section 213(1) of the 1979 Constitution, now section 233(1) of the 1999 Constitution; Ogoyi v. Umagba (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 24) 581; Harrima v. Harrima (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 244. For the appellant to canvass before this court the defence of insanity which was raised at the trial court but abandoned in the Court of Appeal is tantamount to an appeal on an issue directly from the decision of the High Court to the Supreme Court which on the authorities referred to above is objectionable unless upon leave to argue it as a new issue. However, since no objection thereto was raised by any of the parties in this appeal, and having regard to the nature of the appeal involving life and death, I am prepared for what it is worth, to hazard an opinion on the appellant’s defence under consideration. — Edozie JSC.
⦿ PROVING THE DEFENCE OF INSANITY
In considering whether the defence of insanity avails the appellant, it is well to bear in mind that there is a general presumption that every person is sane until the contrary is proved. In the connection, section 27 of the Criminal Code Law of Bendel State applicable in Edo State provides that everyone is presumed to be of sound mind and to have been of sound mind at the time he committed the offence charged. See Onakpoya v. The Queen (1959) NSCC 130, (1959) SCNLR 384. Therefore, an accused person who pleads insanity as a defence to an offence with which he is charged has the burden of proving that he was suffering from insanity or insane delusion at the time the offence with which he was charged was committed. The burden of proof on the accused is on the balance of probability or preponderance of evidence and not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt: see Daniel Madjemu v. State (2001) FWLR (Pt. 52) 2210, (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 718) 349. It must also be borne in mind that it is not every form of mental disorder that can relieve an accused person from criminal responsibility. The law requires that such mental disorder that can avail an accused person as a defence must fall within the ambit of section 28 of the Criminal Code Law (supra) which provides:- “28. A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission if at the time of doing the act or making the omission he is in such a state of mental disease or natural mental infirmity as to deprive him of capacity to understand what he was doing or of capacity to control his actions or of capacity to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission. A person whose mind at the time of his doing or omitting to do an act is affected by delusion on some specific matter or matters but who is not otherwise entitled to the benefit of the foregoing provisions of this section is criminally responsible for the act or omission to the same extent as if the real state of things has been such as was induced by the delusions to believe to exist.” For an accused person to successfully rely on the first limb of section 28 of the Criminal Code (supra), he must prove that at the time the offence was committed, he lacked: the capacity to understand what he was doing capacity to control his action capacity to know that he should not do the act or make the omission: See Adegbesan v. The State (1986) 1 NSCC; Loke v. The State (1985) 1 SC, (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 1 SC; Egbe Nkomu v. The State (1980) 3-4 SC 1; Udofia v. The State (1981) 11-12 SC 49. — Edozie JSC.
➥ LEAD JUDGEMENT DELIVERED BY:
Edozie, JSC
➥ APPEARANCES
⦿ FOR THE APPELLANT(S)
Etigwe Uwa Esq.
⦿ FOR THE RESPONDENT(S)
O. A. Omonuwa Esq.
➥ MISCELLANEOUS POINTS
➥ REFERENCED (LEGISLATION)
➥ REFERENCED (CASE)
➥ REFERENCED (OTHERS)
