➥ CASE SUMMARY OF:
Godwin Chukwuma V. The Federal Republic of Nigeria (SC.253/2007, 20 May 2011)
by Branham Chima (LL.B.)
➥ SUBJECT MATTER(S)
NDLEA;
Cannabis Sativa.
➥ CASE FACT/HISTORY
On the 22nd day of March, 2004, Mr. Godwin Chukwuma (a.k.a. Goddy), a business man, accused/appellant herein, was arrested by the men of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) at Hajiya Halima area, Sokoto, in Sokoto State. The allegation against him was that he was found in possession of 305 kilogrammes of CANABI SATIVA, otherwise known as INDIAN HEMP without lawful authority. On the 30th day of March, 2004, the accused was arraigned before the Federal High court (trial court), holden in Sokoto. The following charge was read and explained to the accused: “That you GODWIN CHUKWUMA (a k.a Goddy) male, 36 years of age of Mabera Area of Sokoto, on or about 22nd March, 2004 at Hajiya Halima area, Sokoto within the jurisdiction of this Honourable court and without lawful authority had in your possession 305 kilogramms of Canabis Sativa otherwise known as Indian Hemp, a Narcotic Drug similar to Cocaine and thereby committed an offence contrary to and punishable under section 10H of the NDLEA (Amendment) Decree No. 15 of 1992.” The accused pleaded not guilty of the offence.
The accused pleaded not guilty of the offence. On the 27th day of April, 2004, trial commenced with prosecution calling five witnesses (in all) and the accused gave what he called statement as an accused and not a witness to himself. He called no witness. That was on the 28th day of July, 2004. Since there was no more witnesses to testify, the learned trial judge adjourned the case for judgment on 21st of September, 2004. On the 21st day of September, the trial court sat for judgment. However, a statement was recorded that the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, Sokoto Command was in receipt of large brown envelope annexed to it’s drug analysis report dated 19th of August, 2004, which the learned counsel for the prosecution applied to be tendered from the bar. The accused was recorded not objecting and stated further that the analysis would assist them to know actually whether the drugs in question was Indian Hemp or not. The trial court admitted the sealed brown envelope in evidence as Exhibit ‘E’. The court directed that Exhibit ‘E’ be unsealed in the open court and contents thereof was read aloud. The accused also read it. The trial court found the substance to be INDIAN HEMP CANABIS SATIVA through one Mr. Afolabi, a Chemistry Forensic Analyst. Thereafter, the accused made a plea to the trial court to tamper justice with mercy as his wife was sick and nobody to help her. He further begged for leniency. He finally stated that the allegation was true and he had no other defence open to him. The trial court thereafter proceeded to deliver its judgment on that same date (21st of September, 2004). It found that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. It found the accused guilty of the offence charged. It convicted him and sentenced him to a minimum period of fifteen (15) years imprisonment without option of fine. Dissatisfied with that decision, the convict appealed to the Kaduna Division of the Court of Appeal (court below). The court below found no merit in the appeal. It dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Dissatisfied further, the appellant filed his appeal to this court.
➥ ISSUE(S)
I. Whether there was evidence before the trial court to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the substance allegedly recovered from the Appellant by men of the NDLEA and analyzed by the Forensic expert was indeed Cannabis Sativa otherwise known as Indian Hemp and that same is a drug similar to cocaine, LSD or heroine?
II. Was the Appellant denied fair trial or in any way prejudiced when the prosecution was allowed by the court to re-open its case on the date fixed for as to enable the prosecution prove some matters of substance relating to the charge?
III. Was the court below correct to have relied on an alleged confessional statement of the Appellant to confirm the conviction and sentence of the Appellant?
➥ RESOLUTION(S) OF ISSUES
[APPEAL DISMISSED]
↪️ ISSUE 1: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[APPELLANT HAS SHOWN NO REASON TO DISTURB THE CONCURRENT FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT
‘While interpreting the above provision, the learned trial judge was of the view that the ingredients required to prove the offence with which the appellant was charged are as follows: (1) That the substance must be Indian Hemp. (2) The accused person possesses it without lawful authority and (3) The possession must be within knowledge of the accused person. The learned trial judge then made his findings as follows: “In the instant case the totality of evidence leaves this court in no doubt 1. The substance in question was immediately tested upon arrest and recovery in the presence of witnesses and the accused person and the substance proved positive for cannabis sativa i.e (Indian Hemp) so also Exhibit ‘E’ expert analysis of the drug. 2. The substance was found and recovered from the possession of the accused Person immediately upon arrest with no lapse of time to create doubt. 3. Accused person knew that he had the substance in question in his possession.” After careful evaluation of the evidence placed before him, the learned trial judge concluded in the following words: “Upon the totality of evidence before this court there is only one conclusion left that is, the prosecution has proved his case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused person and the accused person has failed to rebut and bring himself within the defence or exceptions allowed under the law creating the offence. I therefore, accept the evidence of the prosecution and hereby find the accused person guilty for tie offence charged and hereby convict(ed) him thereof”. Issue one placed for determination before this court was the same issue that was placed before the court below. After redrafting the issues set out by parties, the court below reviewed the evidence before it by the parties. On the issue of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the court below has this to say: “It is a cardinal principle of our criminal law that in all cases, the burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act, subject to certain exceptions is on the prosecution, and if the commission of a crime is directly in issue in any civil or criminal proceedings, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. See section 138 of the Evidence Act, Cap. 112 Law of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990…. Apart from the fact that there is ample evidence adduced by the prosecution in support of its case which has been proved beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant as required by section 138 of the Evidence Act Cap 112 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, there is also the confessional statement of the appellant admitted in evidence marked Exhibit ‘A’ where the appellant admitted committing the offence” (Underlying supplied for emphasis) So, the issue of proof beyond reasonable doubt has concurrently been decided against the appellant by the trial and the lower courts. It is trite law that this court does not interfere with a concurrent finding or decision of the lower courts except where that decision appears to be perverse. See: LAGGA V. SARHUNA (2008) 6 SCNJ 181; DIMEZ NIG. LTD. V. PETER NWAKHOBA (2008) 12 SCNJ 768; AGBONM WANRE OMOREGIE V. THE STATE (2008) 12 SCNJ 723; THEOPHILUS V. THE STATE (1996) 1 SCNJ 79. The appellant has failed to show that the decision on the issue of poof beyond reasonable doubt is perverse. I have no reason to disturb that concurrent finding. Issues one is decided against the appellant.’]
.
.
↪️ ISSUE 2: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[APPELLANT HAD FAIR HEARING
‘Now, the distinguishing features between the present appeal and the above cited case(s) are that in this appeal: (1) there was an oral application to the trial court to admit from the Bar, the forensic analyst report that is Exhibit ‘E’ (2) the appellant represented himself in person and did not object to the tendering of the said report. (3) the trial court after close of the case and before re-opening of same had already made a finding that the prosecution had discharged the burden of proof placed before it. (4) the re-opening of the closed case was at the instance of the prosecution and not at the instance of the trial court. (5) It is not true as submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant was not given an opportunity to react one way or the other. (6) From the totality of the judgment of the trial court, there is nothing to show that the Learned trial judge relied on the said Exhibit ‘E’ to base his conviction and sentence of the appellant.’
‘Therefore, I think every slightest opportunity was given to the appellant for his defence. If there was a misuse of the opportunity or non-challence in the pursuit of a right, it cannot be attributed to the trial court. The trial court, in my view, did all that was statutorily required of it. The admission of a further Exhibit after a date for judgment has been fixed may be wrong. However, it is to be noted, as I said earlier, no portion of the judgment made reference to that exhibit. The learned trial judge was satisfied with the evidence already placed before him which enabled him to make a finding of guilt against the appellant. Further, the affirming of the trial court’s judgment by the court below was also done, in my view, rightly. In my view, the wrong admission of Exhibit ‘E” is not potent enough to course a miscarriage of justice where there is an overwhelming evidence upon which the trial court found the prosecution to have proved it case beyond reasonable doubt. It is trite law that any evidence which is wrongly admitted in evidence or wrongly excluded from evidence cannot of itself be a ground for the reversal of any decision which otherwise could be sustained by any standard. See: NWAEZE V. STATE (1996) 2 SCNJ 42, OLAYINKA V. STATE (2007) 4 SCNJ; 53; NTUKS V. NIGERIAN PORTS AUTHORITY (2007) SCNJ 204. I found it difficult to interfere with the decision of the court below on fair trial/hearing by the trial court.’]
.
.
↪️ ISSUE 3: IN RESPONDENT’S FAVOUR.
[THE COURT DID NOT RELY ON THE CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT
‘I have perused the record of appeal and particularly the judgment of the trial court. It is true that no mention/finding was made on any confessional statement by the trial court. The underlined statements credited to the lower court were made by it to show that in addition to the “ample evidence” adduced before the trial court, there was also a confessional statement of the appellant upon which the appellant could as well be convicted. The learned Justice of the Court of Appeal who wrote the lead did not say that the trial court convicted the appellant on that confessional statement. I think this is an observation which a judge is entitled to do. It is this kind of commission or omission in a judgment writing which is referred to as PER, INCURIAM. It may amount to an innocent error/ accidental/slip inadvertence from the side of the judge. See. GOMBE V. MADAKI and ORS (1982) F.N.R 274 at page 279. AFRO CONTINENTAL NIG. LTD. V. AYANTUYI and ORS. (1991) 3 NWLR (part 178) 211 at page 227. The consensus of legal authorities is that it is not every imaginable slip/error made by a court that will inevitably tilt the decision of, moreso, if it does not occasion any miscarriage of justice. See. UBA V. EUROPHERM NIGERIA LTD. (1990) 6 NWLR (part 115) 239; NWOSU V. I.S.E.S.A (1990) 2 NWLR (part 135) 688; ABUBAKAR V. BEBEJI OIL and ALLIED PRODUCTS LTD. and ORS. (2007) 2 SCNJ 170; IPINLAIYE II V. OLUKOTUN (1996) 6 SCNJ 74; SOLOLA and ORS. V. THE STATE (2005) 11 NWLR (part 137) 460 at page 465. Reference to the confessional statement by the court below in its judgment is a mere inadvertence. The statements made by the court below, as is clear from the excerpt of the judgment quoted above does not add or reduce anything from the weight of evidence already evaluated by the learned trial judge. The comments of the court below on the said confessional statement is inconsequential to the holding of the trial court as well as the final decision of the court below in my view, and I so hold.’]
.
.
.
✓ DECISION:
‘In the final analysis, I find no merit in this appeal and I dismiss it. I affirm the concurrent decisions of the two courts below.’
➥ FURTHER DICTA:
⦿ PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
The burden of proof in our adversarial system of criminal justice is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. In the process, the requirement of the law is that the prosecution has the duty to prove all the essential elements of an offence as contained in the charge. The law places the burden on the prosecution to produce vital material evidence and witnesses to testify during the proceedings before a trial court comes to the conclusion that an offence had been committed by an accused person. The prosecution does not require a magic wand in order to attain to it’s proof to be “beyond reasonable doubt”. All the prosecution is required to do simply is to put forward to the court evidence which is so strong, compelling and convincing against the accused such that it leaves no reasonable man in doubt as to the probability of the accused person committing the alleged offence. That in effect is the interpretation given by our superior courts to the common law origin phrase of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” which has been embellished in section 138 of the Evidence Act CAP 112 LFN, 1990 (Cap E14 LFN, 2004). See the cases of FATOYIBO V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF WESTERN NIGERIA (1966) WRNLR 4; OKEKE V. THE STATE (1995) 4 NWLR (part 392) 676; AKINYEMI v. THE STATE (1999) 6 NWLR (part 607) 449 at page 463 – 464. — I. T. Muhammad JSC.
➥ LEAD JUDGEMENT DELIVERED BY:
I. T. Muhammad, J.S.C.
➥ APPEARANCES
⦿ FOR THE APPELLANT(S)
Mr. Adewunmi Ogunsanya.
⦿ FOR THE RESPONDENT(S)
Olufunke Aboyade.
➥ MISCELLANEOUS POINTS
➥ REFERENCED (LEGISLATION)
➥ REFERENCED (CASE)
➥ REFERENCED (OTHERS)
